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Do protests increase political engagement among the general public? It is
often necessary for social movements to induce widespread political engage-
ment in order to gain leverage over elected officials, but this consequence
of protest activity has never been tested or verified. Indeed, empirical re-
search on the public effects of protests has largely been handicapped by
methodological limitations. I designed a two-pronged experimental design
that causally identifies the effects of protest exposure. The first stage uses a
vignette experiment in Mexico to capture indirect exposure, and the second
stage uses a field experiment to directly expose the same respondents to real
street protests. All of the treatments for the vignette and field experiments
piggyback off of the 2014-2015 protests against organized crime in Mexico.
Through this two-pronged experiment, I find that the form of exposure is
critical in identifying the engaging effects of protests. While the general
public might become enthusiastic and engaged upon hearing news of mass
mobilization, the same people tend to disengage when faced with an actual
protest.
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1. Introduction
For many, political activism can be a frustrating enterprise. A movement may be dedi-
cated and rich in resources, but it is effectively toothless if it fails to move an ambivalent
and fickle general public. What leverage does a protest have against elected officials if
it fails to trigger a reaction from outside its own group? Indeed, many protest move-
ments fizzle away without ever engaging the wider public, and it is not surprising when
these movements do not receive concessions from political leaders. For better or worse,
protesters often rely on the public audience, whose support can apply formidable pres-
sure on elected officials and whose debates can shift the political agenda.
The public can be an ally or an obstacle for protesters, yet its role as an audience has
largely been ignored in academic research (Giugni 1998). This may be due, in part, to
the difficulty of causally identifying these effects. Most protest data suffer from selection
bias, including only the protests that successfully capture the public’s attention. There
are also concerns of endogeneity; it is not clear if public engagement is caused by the
protests or the political environment that generated the protest. Finally, by relying on
news reports of protests for data, extant research fails to capture the confrontation and
drama that is so inherent to real protests.
I have developed two-pronged experimental design to overcome these limitations and
causally identify the audience effects of protests. This design differentiates between
the two main ways that audiences are exposed to protest: indirect exposure through
the news and direct exposure in the streets. First, a vignette experiment conducted
in Mexico City treats individuals with news stories about protests with randomized
characteristics. Second, a field experiment examines the same respondents as they are
personally confronted with real protests. All of the treatments for the vignette and field
experiments piggyback off of the 2014-2015 protests against organized crime in Mexico.
The two experiments yield starkly different results. I find that protests can engage
the general public, but only when they are exposed indirectly. Exposure to a news
story about protests increases the individual’s willingness to talk about a political issue,
sign a petition, and vote. But protest is a double-edged sword. Exposure to a real
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street demonstration decreases the individual’s willingness to talk about a political issue,
protest, and vote. Ultimately, while the general public might become enthusiastic and
engaged upon hearing news of mass mobilization, the same people tend to disengage
when faced with an actual protest.
This paper contributes to the literature on protests in a number of ways. Substantively,
these findings represent a trade-off for protesters, who must confront a wide audience
to attract attention at the expense of alienating that very audience. In the discussion
section, I suggest a number of practical ways that activists could balance the techniques
and geography of protest to minimize the negative effects of confrontation. Methodolog-
ically, these findings serve as a cautionary tale for political science research. A great
deal of recent work in political science attempts to reduce complex political phenomena
to clean and easily manipulated experimental treatments, often at the expense of causal
complexity (Barabas and Jerit 2010, Franco et al. 2015). However, the contrasting find-
ings for the two experiments demonstrate the importance of a diverse set of treatments
and methods that seek to replicate real-life stimuli and make generalizable claims.
2. Protests and the Public
Thus, at face value, the necessarily public nature of protest activity suggests that it
would lend itself easily to public response, but literature rarely seeks to examine the
effects that protests can have on the public. In the first study to empirically assess
the capacity of protest to shape public opinion, Berkowitz (1973) collects data on large,
anti-war protests and compares trends of protest activity with public opinion between
1965 and 1971. While most of the public’s attitudes are not significantly influenced by
protests, he finds that the presence of anti-war protests increased the president’s ap-
proval ratings and popularity. These results are troubling for Berkowitz, who concludes
his article by asking, “What will we do if we face up to the possibility that nothing works,
or that nothing works well, that our society is too atomized, too well-insulated for any
social movement or any scientifically imposed principle to turn it around?” (Berkowitz
1973, p.13). He then begs for additional research to resist the acceptance of null results
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and to isolate when and how social movements can influence public opinion.
For the most part, Berkowitz’s plea for further research on protests and public opinion
went unanswered. Four decades later, recent research highlights the role that protests
can play in shaping public opinion. Much of this scholarship capitalizes on a wave of im-
migrants’ rights protests that overlapped with the data collection of the Latino National
Survey in the United States. This work demonstrates that spatial proximity to protests
shaped Latino Americans’ feelings of empowerment and alienation (Wallace et al. 2014),
issue saliency (Carey et al. 2014), group identity (Mohamed 2012), and policy preferences
(Branton et al. 2015). Evidence beyond the immigration-based protests leads to simi-
larly promising findings. Andrews et al. (2015) merge protest data with a representative
survey conducted in 1961 to explain why a small subset of white Southerners supported
integration, and they find that protest activity in a respondent’s county helped to garner
sympathy for the civil rights movement.
But what is the relationship between protests and political engagement? A small
but productive literature examines the consequences that protests have on individual
protesters, concluding that protests directly and indirectly mobilize individuals to par-
ticipate in subsequent political activity. Evidence from panel studies in East and West
Germany suggests that protest activity increases protests’ political efficacy in addition
to creating a robust direct effect on participation that persists for all model specifications
(Finkel 1987). Sociological literature contributes to these findings by analyzing the du-
ration of these consequences. Scholars follow the New Left activists for several decades,
and they find that former activists continue to promote leftist attitudes (Marwell et al.
1987), self-identify as liberals (Fendrich and Tarleau 1973), and remain mobilized in
social movements at consistently higher levels than non-activists (Fendrich and Lovoy
1988, McAdam 1989). In addition, scholars of protest diffusion have found substantial
evidence for “cycles of contention,” or periods in which contention of one movement in
one location sparks chain reactions in which new social movements and protest groups
emerge at the peak of a protest wave (Klandermans 1990, Tarrow and Tollefson 1994).
To be sure, activists have an incentive to spread political engagement outside of the
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set of protest participants. The ability of protests to induce policy change often depends
on public support. Many scholars have demonstrated that, without favorable public
opinion, the civil right protests of the 1960s and 1970s would have had very little influ-
ence over policy (Burstein 1998, Santoro 2002, Soule and Olzak 2004). While numerous
causal mechanisms might link protests to policy outcomes (Burstein and Linton 2002),
most evidence supports the expectation that protests have a stronger effect when they
operate in conjunction with public opinion (Agnone 2007).
Not unlike protesters, who experience psychological and emotional benefits from the
protest experience (Finkel and Muller 1998, Jasper 1998, Yang 2000), those who are out-
side the group may also experience some participatory externalities from a protest. For
example, social capital theorists contend that individuals learn how to engage in politics
from a broader culture of participation (Putnam et al. 1994, Putnam 2001). Similarly,
casual observation of political participation has been found to be a significant driver of
individual participation (Cho and Rudolph 2008). Cho and Rudolph (2008) find that
when individuals are casually exposed to their neighbor’s campaign paraphernalia, dis-
cussions, or other overt political activity, they glean information about participatory
norms in their community. Thus, individuals who are exposed to protests receive impor-
tant information about the norms of political engagement in their environment. Even if
the exposed individuals are largely ignorant or unaware of the protesters’ claims, casual
observation of the protest indicates that a political issue has attracted crowds of citizens
to the streets.
3. Exposure as Confrontation
Demonstrating a causal link between protests and public engagement faces a significant
challenge i.e., identifying exposure to protests. Of course, much of the public is not an
audience at all. As non-participants of the protest, much of the general public may be
unaware of - or deliberately avoid - protests. Even among the audience that is aware of
the protest, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in how they experience the event. Some
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of the audience may have encountered the protest through the media, others through
word-of-mouth, and others by physical confrontation.
The notion that protest audiences differ by the form of exposure is non-trivial. It is
well-documented in the literature that the medium by which individuals are exposed to
something may be as important as the thing itself. A classic example is public’s response
to crime. Scholars have identified a steady increase in the public’s fear of crime, despite
the fact that crime rates have remained relatively constant. It is often argued that the
underlying root of fear is the shift in media portrayals of crime, rather than crime itself
(Gordon and Heath 1991, Jaehnig et al. 1981, Chiricos et al. 1997, Lowry et al. 2003).
Studies that attempt to compare the effects of real-life crime and media portrayals of
crime consistently find divergent effects (Weitzer and Kubrin 2004, Custers and Van den
Bulck 2011). Because an individual’s perception of crime varies so much between per-
sonal experience and the media, it is unsurprising that different forms of exposure lead
to distinct outcomes.
I argue that reactions to protests also vary as a function of exposure. Specifically, I
argue that personal exposure to protest events differs from exposure through the media.
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow put it aptly when they describe protests as “perfor-
mances” (2015). They constitute a form of political participation that wants to be seen
and experienced by an audience (Benford and Hunt 1992, McAdam 1996). The theatri-
cality at the heart of protest activity arises from the necessity of attracting attention.
Through traffic jams, loud noises, and congregations in important public spaces, they
seek to create their own publicity and attract the most attention as wide an audience
as possible. Media reports may be able to describe the protest, but the drama and
disruption of the full protest experience is necessarily absent from such reports.
To date, scholars have made few efforts to disentangle real protest events from media
reports. The Collective Action Observation Primer (McPhail et al. 1997) is a notable
exception. This handbook describes a methodology to send trained observers to record
what actually happens during various protest events and then compare those notes with
subsequent media coverage. The principal finding from their recorded observations is
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that collective action only very seldom appears uniform or organized (McPhail and
Schweingruber 1998). The protests they attended looked more like loosely connected
congregations of small groups than like homogenous demand-making bodies. While this
disarray might be all-too apparent to an onlooker, it is generally absent from protest
accounts in the media. The authors found that media reports of the same events largely
failed to convey any of these complexities, focusing instead on the small fraction of be-
haviors that were most organized and collective. Although the protest event is the same
and the message is the same, the audience of the news report will come away with a
very different experience than that of the audience in the street.
With this in mind, how might the audience’s reaction to a real protest differ from that
of a protest reported in the media? In the only chapter to date on protest bystanders,
Gamson offers a possible answer. He supposes it unlikely that the public will make an
effort to understand and appreciate the unruly and disruptive protest. “For [bystanders
of the protest],” he intimates that “the issues being debated by the contestants in the
arena are unimportant relative to the collateral damage and inconvenience they pro-
duce” (2004, p. 244). This suggestion challenges the vast majority of social movement
literature, which is highly aware of the protesters’ need to occupy and interrupt public
life in order to capture an audience (Benford and Hunt 1992, McAdam 1996, McCarthy
and McPhail 2006), but widely assumes that the public does not mind the interruption.
It is possible that the public begrudges its role as a captive audience and focuses more
on the inconvenience of the event than the message.
This hypothesis has never been empirically tested, but pieces of evidence appear
between-the-lines of journalists’ protest reports. Although interviews with protest by-
standers are fairly rare, examples from the US (Newcomb 2011), Egypt (Afify and Au-
diaug 2011), Russia (Mackey and Roth 2013), Hong Kong (Branigan 2014), and Mexico
City (Proal 2015) tend to describe the non-participating public as confused, annoyed,
frustrated. Certainly, these bystanders do not react as if they desperately crave to join
the picket-line or research the protesters’ claims. On the contrary, when they are con-
fronted with the protests’ disruptive or confusing tactics, these bystander audiences fail
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to notice the protest message at all. Rather than observing a broad political strug-
gle, they appear only see a personal inconvenience, a traffic jam, or a scattered crowd.
Although anecdotal, these reactions are indicative of an important, though mostly un-
spoken, public reaction to protest.
In this context, it is likely that the public’s response to protest depends on how they
are exposed to the event. The media can separate the message of the protest from the
experience of the event. The audience is pointed directly to the protesters’ goals and
targets without experiencing the crowd and the distractions. Meanwhile, for those who
are exposed to the protest in the streets, delivery of the protest message depends on the
protest experience, which often does not reduce to the well-defined objectives and clear
narratives identified in news reports.
4. An Experimental Design for Protest Exposure
The empirical designs traditionally used to examine public consequences of protest have
struggled to identify and verify protest exposure. From Berkowitz in the 1970s to the
Latino public opinion research of 2014, the methodological crux of all these designs de-
pend on the merging of media-based protest even data into large, scientifically sampled
surveys. This approach represents a creative and innovative way to study the effects of
protest on public opinion, but it does come with its own shortcomings. First, individual
exposure to the protest is not verified. Exposure to protest is operationalized as living
with a specifically-assigned radius of a reported protest. In a traditional experiment,
one might say that only the Intent-to-Treat - rather than the actual treatment - can
be verified. In a fully experimental setting, analysis of the ITT would be justified by
random assignment, but in a quasi-experimental setting such as this, the assumption of
random assignment does not hold. Indeed, the cities in which protests take place are
almost certainly different from those without protests, and those individuals who are
exposed to the protest are almost certainly different from those who are not exposed.
In this case, the ITT is heavily confounded by variables at the individual-level and the
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higher geographic level.
Additional shortcomings stem from the media-based data on protests. The assump-
tion that protest report data creates a comprehensive or representative sample of all
protests has been taken to task on multiple occasions, and many critics argue that these
data suffer from selection bias (Franzosi 1987, Rucht and Neidhardt 1999, Oliver and
Maney 2000, Earl et al. 2004). More pertinent to my research question, these data fail to
distinguish between different types and degrees of exposure. The scholars who depend
on media reports of protest have no idea whether or not, to what degree, and by what
medium individuals may have been treated. Indeed, the heterogeneity of exposure may
potentially determine its effects, so it is important to incorporate them into the research
design.
In order to explain the effects of protests on public opinion while addressing the
methodological challenges of previous research, I have designed a two-stage experiment.
In the first stage, individuals in five centrally-located colonias in Mexico City 1 are sam-
pled and contacted for a phone survey, which includes an embedded vignette experiment
on protests. For the second stage, all respondents for the phone survey are invited to
attend a follow-up face-to-face interview. During that interview, respondents are ex-
posed (or, in the case of the control group, not exposed) to a real protest as they answer
a battery of items on political engagement. The different stages of the experiment ex-
pose the same respondents to two types of protest treatments - a vignette treatment
that represents media exposure to protests and a field treatment that represents a real
protest. The experimental design aims to measure both types of exposure media and
confrontational with the expectation that the effects would diverge.
The vignette and field treatments were based on real anti-violence protests in that
took place in Mexico City in 2014-2015. In September 2014, these protests began in
response to the disappearance and alleged mass murder of 43 leftist student teachers
from the Ayotzinapa teachers’ college in the southern town, Iguala, in the state of Guer-
rero. Although there was no central social movement to organize events after the attack,
1Azcapotzalco, Gustavo Madero, Benito Juarez, Cuauhtemoc, Miguel Hidalgo, and Venustiano Car-
ranza
9
a series of protests took the nation by storm as hundreds of thousands of participants
mobilized to demand government accountability, improved democratic processes, justice
for the victims’ families, and a general break from the corrupt status quo in Mexican
politics. Although there are countless protests to choose from in Mexico City, these
protests are ideal for this study because they were 1) expected to last for the duration of
the study, 2) highly diverse in terms of protest techniques and strategies, 3) not overtly
partisan, and 4) substantively important for Mexico and other countries suffering from
organized violence.2
4.1. Political Engagement
Political engagement, as a multifaceted concept, is operationalized through six items
that range from deliberative engagement to active participation, and they include in-
stitutionalized forms of action such as voting alongside contentious forms of action like
protest. I operationalize post-treatment engagement through a battery where the re-
spondent is asked, “On a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 means very likely and 4 means not
at all likely), how likely are you to do the following things in the next two weeks?”The
activities are: 1) Talk with friends and/or family about organized crime, 2) Read about
organized crime in the news, 3) sign a Petition demanding that the government take
action against organized crime, 4) Contact a politician to address the topic of organized
crime, 5) participate in a Protest against organized crime, and 6) Vote for a candidate
in the June 7th elections because of his position on organized crime.
The field experiment also provided an opportunity to evaluate observable behavior,
rather than self-reported willingness to engage in politics. At the end of the face-to-face
interview, the enumerators asked respondents if they would like to sign a petition against
2More information on case selection can be found in Appendix A.
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organized crime.3 and/or take home a pamphlet of information about the protests.4
With the addition of these items, I removed the Petition item from the self-reported
engagement indicators in the field instrument to avoid repetition.
4.2. Stage 1: The Vignette Experiment
Through a Random-Digit-Dialing process, respondents in Mexico City were contacted
to participate in a phone survey on political participation in Mexico.5 The phone sur-
vey was conducted in two separate samples; the first sample was collected in late April
(n=606) and the second in early May (n=600).6 The entire phone survey was timed
to last for 15 minutes, and it included items to measure basic demographics, political
engagement and preferences, exposure to protests, a randomized vignette item, post-
treatment engagement indicators, and contact information for the follow-up component.
Near the end of the survey instrument, the respondents received a vignette of a fic-
tional, though plausible, news story.7 Four out of every five respondents heard a story
about a protest against organized violence in Mexico. The vignette followed a fully fac-
torial design with two factors (size and level of violence) with two levels for each ([thou-
sands of participants / a small group] and [march with little candles, ended peacefully
/ angry march with torches, ended in a violent confrontation with police], and resulted
in four possible combinations.8 Given the multitude of protests that occur in Mexico
City on a regular basis, it would not have been surprising that the protest may have
3The team from BGC Beltra´n helped to write the petition to elicit signatures from a wide-range of
respondents. In order to avoid pushing away respondents, the petition described very moderate
demands such as justice and accountability, and it deliberately avoided the inflammatory language of
some protest groups and politically divisive demands (such as the presidents resignation from office).
4Respondents who responded affirmatively received pamphlets given to us by the Planto´n por Ayotzi-
napa
5All data were collected by the Mexico City-based survey firm, BGC Beltra´n y Asocs.
6Appendix B presents descriptive statistics on each of the samples and shows that they are not signifi-
cantly or substantively different from one another.
7It was a relatively long vignette for a phone survey. To help respondents keep their attention, we timed
it to last no longer than one minute, and we pre-tested the vignette several times until respondents
confirmed that it did not feel long. We also introduced the vignette by telling respondents that
they would have to answer some questions on what they heard so they might pay closer attention to
contact.
8See Appendix C for the English versions of the vignettes.
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actually occurred. Furthermore, the enormous diversity of marches following the events
Ayotzinapa made any of the four versions of the protest (small/violent, small/peaceful/
large/violent, and large/peaceful) very realistic and credible.
One in every five respondents received a control version of the vignette. The con-
trol version was designed to contain the same basic information without including any
mention of a protest. To make this possible, the control vignette discussed the results
of a recently published survey that contained the general messages as the protest. The
survey mentions that a majority of citizens are tired with organized crime in Mexico
since the events in Ayotzinapa, but there is no consensus regarding the culpability of the
crimes or what should be done about it. This vignette controls for the possibility that
the respondent changes their opinions by mechanisms that are not explicitly related to
the protest - such as following the crowd or observing political discord.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of the engagement indicators for the control group
and treatment groups in the post-treatment outcomes. For parsimony, I have combined
all of the treatment groups so that the difference between the treatment and control
represents exposure to any vignette with a protest. The distributions reveal interesting
information about the participatory patterns of the respondents. Clearly, of all the indi-
cators, respondents were least likely to contact a politician. Respondents were nearly as
unlikely to participate in a protest. For all other engagement indicators, the responses
appear more or less bimodal, with clear stacking at both extremes.
For many of the engagement indicators, there are observable differences between the
control and treatment groups. Relative to the control group, the treatment groups
demonstrate greater willingness to participate in nearly all of the participatory acts,
with the least noticeable differences present for contacting a politician. For nearly all
acts, there is a decline in the number of respondents who report being very unlikely
to participate (indicated by a score of 1) when respondents are primed with a protest
vignette. The protest-treated respondents have greater representation on the higher end
of the scale, with higher frequencies at scores of 3 and 4.
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Figure 1:
4.3. Stage 2: The Field Experiment
At the end of the phone survey, respondents were notified that they could receive com-
pensation for completing a follow-up, face-to-face interview at a specific time, date, and
location.9 Reminders of the times and locations of the follow-up interviews were sent to
each respondent who provided contact details. The date and time block designated to
each respondent determined whether or not they would be exposed to a protest during
their follow-up interview.10 Respondents were invited to one of three follow-up interview
dates: a small protest (estimated 300 participants), a large protest (estimated 5,000 par-
ticipants), and a control with no protest.11 All respondents contacted in April for the
phone survey were invited to the small protest, and all respondents in May were invited
9Respondents received a gift card to Liverpool, an upscale department store, valued at $500 MX (ap-
proximately $40 USD).
10Respondents were not told that there would be a protest upon their arrival. All respondents in the
treatment and control groups were told that they should leave plenty of time for traffic, given that
there are often protests and events downtown.
11See Appendix D for more information about the protests used as treatments and the control condition.
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to the large protest. For the control event, respondents who did not attend either event
were re-contacted and re-invited. After respondents were exposed (or, in the case of the
control group, not exposed) to the treatment, they responded to an abridged version of
the phone survey instrument.
Protests are always, to some extent, unpredictable, and running an experiment under
necessarily unpredictable circumstances made pure randomization logistically impossi-
ble. In large part, I designed the experiment to accommodate the imperfect random-
ization. All comparisons were drawn among compliers in the control and treatment
groups. The pre-treatment questionnaires asked that all respondents to go through the
same process of being interviewed and re-interviewed. The control and treatment groups
are pooled from exactly the same set of respondents who express interest in participating
in a follow-up study, and they are asked to go to a directly comparable location as the
treatment group. The only difference is the day in which they are asked to arrive, such
that one group encounters a protest and the other does not.
This does not guarantee that respondents in all groups are equivalent. Furthermore,
the type of person who complied with the invitation would almost certainly differ from
those who did not comply. I accounted for imbalances and self-selection in the analysis
stage. Table 1 presents a clear summary of the analytical techniques used to account for
non-randomness.
Table 1: Quasi-Experimental Design and Analysis
Stage Groups Non-Randomness Analysis Stage
Treatment Small Protest Random assignment between Inverse probability weighting
Assignment Large Protest small and large protests; balancing treatment and control
Control control respondents re-invited groups
Treatment Compliers Calculate treatment effects with
Treatment Treatment Non-Compliers All respondents were invited, selection model, correcting
Compliance Control Compliers only few self-select for the differences between
Control Non-Compliers into the sample attendees and non-attendees
Out of all 1,200 invited subjects, 89 attended a follow-up interview event.12 The small
12For more information on these compliers - how many respondents provided contact information and
what percentage of those actually attended - please see Appendix E.
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protest event resulted in 16 respondents, 54 in the large protest event, and 19 respondents
in the control event. Of all of these attendees, only one respondent was unable to be
identified with a match in the phone survey. This respondent, who attended the large
protest, was removed from the field data, resulting in a total of 88 compliers. It is hard
to know exactly why the large protest event resulted in much higher turnout than the
other events, but the likely explanation is the timing. The first protest took place on a
weekend, and the second took place on a weekday, when many respondents would have
already been downtown.
Figure 2 presents the distributions of the engagement indicators for the control group
and treatment groups in the post-treatment outcomes. As with the vignette experiment,
I have combined all of the treatment groups so that the difference between the treatment
and control is exposure to either of the protest treatments. Relative to the pre-treatment
engagement measures and the phone survey control group, very few respondents in the
face-to-face control group are willing to tell the enumerator that they are not at all likely
to participate in the political activities. It is likely that these differences resulted from
social desirability bias, which would likely be higher in the face-to-face interviews than
over the phone. Thus, mode differences make it imprudent to compare the control group
of the vignette experiment to the control of the field experiment.
Direct comparisons between the face-to-face treatment and control groups are very
revealing. Relative to the subtle differences in the vignette experiment, the differences
between the response distributions in the field experiment are visually striking. On every
engagement indicator, the treatment group responses are stacked farther to the extremes
than the control group. Values of 2 and 3 are quite rare in the treatment groups. The
highest proportion for a value of 2 or 3 appears in the Vote indicator, where 16% of
the treatment group stated a value of 2. On the other hand, very high proportions are
stacked at values of 1 and 4. Approximately 50% of the treatment groups selected a
value of 4 for Read and a value of 1 for Protest. In similar fashion as the phone survey,
contacting a politician is a very unpopular activity, where 68% of the control group and
77% of the treatment group selected values of 1.
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Figure 2:
Figure 3 shows the results for the two behavioral indicators: signing the petition
against organized violence and taking a pamphlet of information about the issue. For
both the treatment and control groups, very high proportions signed the petition and
took the pamphlets. For the pamphlet indicator, the distributions are nearly identical
with approximately 90% of each group accepting the offered informational pamphlet.
The petition indicator shows some differences between groups; 10% more respondents in
the treatment group signed the petition than the control group.
16
Figure 3:
5. Analysis and Results
5.1. Vignette Experiment: Estimation
First, I will discuss the estimation and results of the vignette experiment. Although
the dependent variables were measured using Likert response scales, I modeled them
as binary outcomes, where 0 represents a score of 1 or 2 for willingness to participate
in each activity and, and 1 indicates score of 3 or 4. These transformations are more
consistent with the response distributions, which tended to stack heavily on the lowest
and highest extremes of the scale. Logit models also ease the interpretation of the results
relative to ordered models. All results are displayed in terms of marginal effects so that
the magnitude of the effect can be interpreted directly. The statistical models include
indicators for each version of the treatment while assigning the control version as the
reference group. Thus, the marginal effect of each treatment represents the effect of
receiving a specific protest condition relative to the control vignette.
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These models include a number of control variables. In addition to standard demo-
graphic items, the models include political and protest-related variables measured in
the phone survey instrument. More information on these variables (including question-
wording, response options, and summary statistics) can be found in Appendix B.
5.2. Vignette Experiment: Results
Figure 1 illustrates the treatment effects of each vignette for different model specifica-
tions. The blue bars represent the model with no controls, the pink bars include only
demographic variables (sex, age, SES, education, and traditional partisanship), and the
green bars include the entire list of covariates. Full output can be found in Appendix
F. A comparison of all models in Figure 1 suggests that the results are fairly robust to
the inclusion of covariates, although the marginal effects of the treatments tend to de-
crease as more controls are added. Statistical significance does not vary for most models,
with the clear exception of the Big/Peaceful treatment. This vignette results in positive
increases in Read, Petition, and Protest for the reduced model and the demographic
model, but these effects are insignificant when all of the covariates are included.
The fully-specified models show that hearing about a protest - as one would on the
radio can make individuals more likely to engage in political issues. Upon hearing about
a recent protest against organized crime, respondents were significantly more likely to
consider talking about, signing a petition against, or voting base on organized crime.
Many effects are only significant for the large protest treatments, suggesting that respon-
dents who hear news of small protests are less likely to engage. The effects are strongest
and most consistent for the Big/Violent protest treatment. When briefly primed with
a news story about such a protest, respondents are 8.7% more likely to talk about the
issue with their friends or family, 10% more likely to sign a petition about organized
crime, and 12% more likely to vote for a sympathetic candidate.
There are also significant effects for the Small/Violent vignette, though these effects
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Figure 4:
are only significant at the 90% level. As is shown in Figure 1, this treatment has a neg-
ative effect on the respondent’s willingness to talk about organized crime and a positive
effect on petition signing. The magnitude of these effects are relatively strong; receiving
this treatment makes the respondent 8% less likely to talk and 8% more likely to sign a
petition.
The differences between the null models and the fully controlled models suggest that
some treatment effects may be conditional on pre-treatment covariates. In particular, it
is plausible that the effect of the vignette treatments would diverge between those who
support or oppose the protest. A full discussion and analysis of heterogeneous effects
can be found in Appendix G, but the analysis generally indicated that protest support
can be a significant moderator for the vignette experiment.
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5.3. Field Experiment: Estimation
The causal effect of the field experiment is not so straight-forward to identify. Although
I restrict the analysis to only compare compliers across groups, there is still a possibil-
ity that the respondents who attend the control group event are different from those
who attend a treatment event. I use inverse probability weighting (IPW) to account for
residual differences between the treatment-group compliers and control-group compliers.
IPW is a two-step estimation procedure that corrects for differences between treatment
and control groups. First, it computes the inverse probability weights as the inverse of
the probability of receiving treatment, given X covariates, or 1/Pr(T=1—X). Next, it
calculates the differences between the newly weighted means. Thus, this method corrects
for the observable differences between treatment and control groups before assessing the
differences between those groups on the outcomes.
To generate the weights, I modeled treatment assignment as a function of the following
covariates: political interest, partisanship, willingness to debate, past protest behavior,
and knowing a victim of organized crime. Theoretically these variables might influence
an individual’s choice to be re-interviewed on a day when there is an Ayotzinapa protest
relative to a day without a protest.13 I did not include demographic variables in the
weights because they imposed high restrictions on the overlap assumption. This assump-
tion states that 0 < Pr(ti)|X < 1 for all treatment levels. That is, every respondent
must have some chance of being assigned to the treatment group or the control group.
IPW is highly sensitive to overlap; if the treatment model is too restrictive, and if the
data show that there are covariate patterns for which there are no respondents in either
the treatment or control groups, the weights will be too large and the estimates unsta-
ble. 14 Not only were demographic variables too highly correlated with one value of
treatment assignment, but they do not explain treatment assignment in a way that is
conceptually distinct from the selected variables.
13I did attempt to work with protest routes that were not advertised in advance in order to keep this
from significantly driving results.
14Appendix H discusses the overlap of the IPW treatment and control groups and shows plots of the
final models.
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5.4. Field Experiment: Results
Figures 4 and 5 show the differences in means between the treatment and control groups.
Using the inverse-probability weights, selection into the treatment and control groups
is considered to be as-if-random, and differences between groups reflect the presence
of a protest at the time of interview. Consistent with the vignette experiment, the
dependent variables are transformed as a dummy variable in which 0 stands for scores
of 1 and 2 while 1 stands for scores of 3 and 4. The observational outcomes in Figure 5
are dichotomous in nature, where individuals either take the pamphlet/sign the petition
or not. For both figures, the first panel compares the small protest to the control, the
second panel compares the large protest to the control, and the last panel compares the
presence of either protest to the control.
Figure 5:
Figure 4 depicts fairly consistent, primarily negative, effects of the protest treatments.
On average, exposure to protests in the field makes individuals less likely to talk about
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Figure 6:
political issues, to join a protest, and vote for a sympathetic candidate. The impact
on willingness to read about the issue is quite small and not significantly different from
zero, and the effects on the willingness to contact a politician are ambiguous.
These effects are relatively consistent across treatment groups. The small protest has
less clear effects with much wider confidence intervals. Indeed, the only indicator that
achieves statistical significance (at the 90% level) is Talk. The most obvious explanation
for the wide confidence intervals is the smaller sample that arrived at the small protest
follow-up. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the point estimates for both protest treat-
ments have the same sign for every indicator except Contact. Of course, it is difficult
to draw conclusions about effects that do not achieve significance, but it is possible that
smaller protests do not draw the same antagonism against elected politicians as larger
protests.
The results from the large protest and the combination indicator are much easier to
interpret. In the presence of a large protest, the average respondent feels less likely
to engage in politics than he would in the absence of a protest. More specifically, the
presence of a large protest made individuals 20% less likely to talk about the organized
crime, 26% less likely to join a protest against organized crime, and 38% less likely to
vote for a candidate because of his stance on violence.
As is clear in Figure 5, the effects of protests on the behavioral measures of engage-
ment were far less dramatic. There were no significant differences between treatment and
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control groups for either receiving the pamphlet or signing the petition. Recalling Fig-
ure 3, between 80% and 90% of respondents in all three groups took the pamphlet, and
even more signed the petition.With such low variation, there is little room to estimate
a treatment effect.
Do the starkly different findings in the two experiments necessarily indicate disparate
responses to the protest treatments? Or might the divergent results be driven by the
characteristics of the distinct samples? The vignette experiment benefits from a large
random sample, and outcomes are observed for every respondent. The field experiment,
on the other hand, represents a truncation of that sample in which outcomes are only
observed among those who select into that sample. Truncation alone is not necessarily
problematic when the selection process is “ignorable,” or missing at random. That is
not likely to be the case in this design. The type of respondent who is likely to attend a
follow-up interview is expected to be systematically different from the type of respondent
in the full sample who chooses not to attend.
To test if the divergent effects of the field and vignette experiments are driven by
selection bias, I analyze the field experiment using selection models. These models in-
corporate information from the full sample to parametrically detect and correct for the
selection bias of the field experiment (Heckman 1976; 1979, Greene 1981) The selection
model follows a two-step procedure. The first step estimates the effect of the treatment
on the outcome variables, and the second estimates selection into the sample using the
full list of pre-treatment covariates measured during the phone survey.
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Table 2: Selection Equation
(1)
Attendance
b/se
Male -0.095
(0.23)
Age -0.001
(0.01)
Education 0.039
(0.07)
SES 0.027
(0.05)
EPN Approval -0.096
(0.14)
Political Interest 0.329∗∗
(0.12)
Traditional Partisan 0.492+
(0.25)
Debater 0.549∗
(0.25)
Protester -0.280
(0.29)
Number of Protests 0.088
(0.10)
Victim -0.091
(0.24)
N 1113
In Table 2, I demonstrate that this selection equation captures important differences
between compliers and non-compliers.15 The model shows that two variables positively
predict attendance at a follow-up interview: interest in politics and willingness to de-
bate contentious issues. This finding has face validity. It seems clear that attendance
for a follow-up interview about political issues would be related to interest in politics
and willingness to discuss politics. Intuitively, these individuals would be least likely to
respond negatively to the protest experience. Should the entire sample from the phone
survey have complied with the field experiment, it seems unlikely that the treatment
effects would be positive, as they were in the vignette experiment.
Next, I use the selection equation from Table 2 to correct for sample selection bias
in the treatment effects of the field experiment. The results of these models are de-
picted in Figure 6. There are few statistically significant findings emerging from these
15This model predicts correct outcome 71.90% of the time.
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models; only willingness to vote passes the threshold to significance. The wide confi-
dence intervals are not surprising, given the small sample size for the outcome equation.16
Figure 7:
Despite the lack of significance, there are meaningful implications to draw from Figure
6. While the wide confidence intervals make it impractical to draw conclusions about
the effects of the field experiment, the selection models help to rule out some of the
more problematic alternative hypotheses. Specifically, it appears unlikely that the neg-
ative direction of the field experiment’s treatment effects was simply a function of the
truncated sample. Controlling for the differences between compliers and non-compliers,
the treatment effects in the selection models still imitate the average treatment effects
of the field experiment quite closely. In fact, the coefficient for Vote is much greater
in magnitude than for the complier-only model. This weakly suggesting that the full
sample (consisting of compliers and non-compliers) might have actually responded more
strongly to the treatment than did the compliers only. Considering the differences be-
16It is worth noting that the estimates for Contact are potentially unstable. For these models, the
repeated rho ranges from -1 to 1.
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tween compliers and non-compliers, this finding would not seem out of place. If the
sample were not truncated to the most political interested and contentious respondents,
protests may have even stronger negative effects on political engagement. The evidence,
while still very inconclusive, suggests that the positive treatment effects in the vignette
experiment and negative effects in the field experiments are not simply a function of the
non-random compliance.
6. Discussion
It is hardly disputable that many protests in democratic countries seek to ignite widespread
political engagement. After all, as general engagement in politics increases, so too does
the pressure on political decision-makers. This implicit goal was made explicit by civil
rights activist, Martin Luther King, who maintained that protest is a powerful weapon
because it forces the public to discuss, challenge, and fight for political issues. Protest
creates “a tension in the mind” and “a situation so crisis-packed” among the masses
until negotiation becomes the only way out (King Jr 1963, p.4-5). Protests thrust the
broader public - even those who never join the movement - into the political debate until
elected officials have no choice but to respond.
Despite the fact that social movements so often aspire to mold, engage, and interrupt
civil society, these consequences of protest activity are largely neglected in the litera-
ture. This is the first empirical research to address how protests can engage or disengage
the public audience. I find that news of protest activity can engage people in political
issues and even inspire them to take action, but those same people can disengage when
confronted with real protests. Encountering a protest indirectly through the media can
have a contagious effect on political engagement. However, the real-life disruption that
protests cause can have a counter-productive outcome. Taken at face value, these find-
ings represent a trade-off for protesters. On the one hand, a wide audience is necessary
to spread a message and pose a credible threat to the status quo. On the other hand,
the strategies available to protesters - disruption, confrontation, civil disobedience, or
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even violence - may drive away that audience.
Evidence for these findings is based on a two-pronged experimental design, with a
vignette and a field component. Both experimental designs demonstrated that protest
exposure can influence political engagement, but the direction of the effects differs for
the two experiments. On the one hand, the vignette treatments generally resulted in in-
creased engagement. The significant effects are largely limited to the vignettes represent-
ing large protests, but the positive direction of the effect is fairly consistent throughout
the treatments.17 On the other hand, the field treatments resulted in political disen-
gagement over a wide range of indicators. Again, this effect was more pronounced for
the large protest treatment than the small protest, but the direction of the effect is con-
sistent. Moreover, the direction of the effect does not appear to change when adjusting
the selection into the field experiment.
The apparent divergence in treatment effects has substantive and methodological im-
plications. Substantively, this is preliminary evidence that 1) protests do influence public
engagement, 2) the effect can be positive or negative, and 3) the way in which respondents
encounter a protest is more determinant of their reaction than the actual characteristics
of the protest they observe. Of course, further analysis is necessary to assess the mech-
anisms and validity behind these effects, but the basic findings represent a substantial
contribution to the literature on protest consequences.
Of course, further research will be necessary to draw generalizations from this case.
There are some important scope conditions for the geographic and thematic cases se-
lected. Regarding the geographic selection, Mexico City is an especially easy case to test
in some respects. Citizen participation habits are quite flexible, and there is a constant
stream of protest activity. Under these circumstances, it is imprudent to make gen-
eralizations about the effects of protests where participation is highly institutionalized
and ritual or where protests occur infrequently. Also, the topic of the protests polit-
ical violence or organized crime is not as controversial or contentious as many topics
of protest. Again, it is plausible that the experiment would yield different outcomes
17Appendix G shows that these effects are strongest and most consistent among those respondents who
disapprove of the sitting president.
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for a different set of protests. For these reasons, further research is necessary to de-
termine if these findings extend to other cities and other protests. But what does
this mean for protesters? My findings suggest that protesters can strategize their tech-
niques and protest geography to minimize the number of directly-exposed bystanders
while maximizing indirectly-exposed audience. Protests that expand spatially without
gaining significant media coverage appear counter-productive. This would include the
Occupy Wall Street camps that spread to medium-sized and small cities throughout the
United States even though most media attention focused on the New York site. On the
other hand, techniques that focus primarily on attracting the media, techniques such as
Hacktivism, might benefit from this trade-off.
This brings me to the methodological contribution. Given the complex and highly
confounded nature of protest emergence, there is ample potential for experimental de-
signs to answer challenging questions on protest contexts and political behavior (for
an example, see McClendon (2014)). However, the key take-away point is that nei-
ther experiment would have captured these effects in isolation. The causal relationship
takes form through the combination of the field and survey experiments. This suggests
that experimental designs may need to conjoin multiple forms of treatments in order to
fully explain complex social processes. While this paper illustrates the use for multiple
treatments, there are certainly other examples where personal encounters with political
events invoke emotional, visceral, or confused reactions that can only be captured via
direct-exposure treatments. Examples of such events might include repression, group
discrimination, or campaign events. Clean, hypothetical, and easily manipulated treat-
ments may tell us something about how individuals respond to such events, but we are
likely missing a large part of the story.
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Appendices
A. Case Selection
I have chosen to conduct this project in Mexico City. As a result of the country’s gradual
process of democratization, Mexican citizens are still questioning and developing their
patterns of participation (Almond and Verba 1965, Lawson and McCann 2003). Weak
ideological and partisan attachments make Mexican voters particularly malleable and
uncommitted (Lawson 2015, Nichter and Palmer-Rubin 2015). This type of flexible
citizen is ideal for testing hypotheses on the increases and decreases in engagement.
Furthermore, Mexico City contains a rich diversity and heavy level of protest activity.
Indeed, the city government counted approximately 3,000 protests of all shapes and
sizes in 2012 (Sheridan 2013). Unlike other countries, in which protests are dominated
by a particular sector, Mexico’s revolutionary past and relatively closed political system
spark protests among nearly all sectors of society, including the agricultural sector,
intellectuals, students, working poor, and the informal sector (Gutmann 2002, Hodges
et al. 2002). Significant events, such as the student massacre in 1968 and the 1985
earthquake in Mexico City, have justified protest activity as a crucial and respected
means of political participation (Wood 2001, Johnston and Almeida 2006, Mattiace
2011). Finally, the immense size of the city also makes it ideal to examine the self-
selection of protest exposure. Because of the structure of neighborhoods, or colonias, it
is very possible for individuals to avoid protest-ridden areas if they please. As a result,
although all respondents will be from the same city, the respondents’ local contexts will
vary a great deal in terms of past exposure to protest activity.
All treatments were based on real anti-violence protests in that took place in Mexico
City in 2014-2015. In September 2014, these protests began in response to the disap-
pearance and alleged mass murder of 43 leftist student teachers from the Ayotzinapa
teachers’ college in the southern town, Iguala, in the state of Guerrero. Although there
was no central social movement to organize events after the attack, a series of protests
took the nation by storm as hundreds of thousands of participants mobilized to demand
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government accountability, improved democratic processes, justice for the victims’ fami-
lies, and a general break from the corrupt status quo in Mexican politics. These protests
are ideal for this project for a number of reasons. Although there are countless protests
to choose from in Mexico City, these protests were 1) expected to last for the duration
of the study, 2) highly diverse, 3) non-partisan, and 4) substantively important.
The demands of the protests were so unattainable that there was no obvious end to the
mobilizations. The primary rallying-cry of the protest is, “They brought [the 43 students]
alive, we want them brought back alive” (“Vivos los llevaron, vivos los queremos!”), even
though there is certainly no doubt that the students were killed shortly after being taken.
If there is any unattainable goal, it is the reappearance of the 43 students. Furthermore,
the protests deeper goals of political accountability, the eradication of corruption, and a
permanent solution to drug violence appear to be nearly as unattainable as the students’
miraculous reappearances. The apparently insatiable demands of the protests were very
important to this project because the movement did not depend on one specific issue
with a finite horizon, and they could mobilize throughout the year of fieldwork.
Also, these protests were highly diverse and did not confine themselves to any specific
repertoire. This is largely possible because no single group dominated in the organization
of protests. In an early protest, a subgroup of a larger march burned a massive effigy of
President Pen˜a Nieto in the middle of the Zo´calo and set fire to the door of the National
Palace (Sim 2014). In other marches, participants held little candles to represent the
demand for peace (Olivares 2014). There were sit-ins in front of the attorney general’s
office (Me´ndez 2014), caravans that traveled from all over the country to march on
the nation’s capital (Saldan˜a 2014), and highly creative artistic exhibitions (Marro´n and
Jime´nez Jaramillo 2015). Some protests were very small with a few hundred participants,
and others contained thousands of people. This diversity is critical for validity of the
treatments. The treatments randomize characteristics of the protests in order to measure
the relative impact of different protests, but few movements could contain such a wide
set of protest events to make this randomization plausible.
Third, relative to most protest organizations in Mexico, these events appeared to be
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distinctly non-partisan. While some of the protests were organized by groups with clear
partisan affiliations, there were so many groups mobilizing for the same cause that the
partisan message was not immediately clear or consistent. Indeed, the demands of the
group (accountability, justice, and an end to violence) are largely non-controversial, and
not a single political party stood up against the protesters’ claims. This is important
because there would be few respondents who would oppose these protests on behalf of
a deeply-set political affiliation, and theoretically, any respondent of any party would
have the potential to be swayed to action as a result of protest exposure.
Finally, these protests are substantively important for Mexico and other countries
that struggle with corruption and violence. Over the past decade, many thousands
of Mexicans have died as a result of cartel violence, but the gruesome massacre of 43
student teachers hit a nerve that reverberated throughout the world (Kennis 2014). The
impact of this event was so strong that protests continued for approximately a year after
the original killing took place. Did these protests bring the general public to become
political engaged and involved in these political issues? If protests can generate public
engagement, these effects would be most important for an issue with such high stakes
and wide-reaching significance as political/drug violence.
Of course, single case studies never allow for unlimited generalization, and this disser-
tation is no exception. There are some important scope conditions for the geographic and
thematic cases selected. Regarding the geographic selection, Mexico City is an especially
easy case to test in some respects. Citizen participation habits are quite flexible, and
there is a constant stream of protest activity. Under these circumstances, it is impru-
dent to make generalizations about the effects of protests where participation is highly
institutionalized and ritual or where protests occur infrequently. Also, the topic of the
protests - political violence or organized crime - is not as controversial or contentious as
many topics of protest. Again, it is plausible that the experiment would yield different
outcomes for a different set of protests. For these reasons, it is important to test the
external validity of these findings in future research.
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B. Descriptions of covariates
Table B.1: Indicators
Indicator Survey Item Response Options
Male Respondent’s gender 1=Male ; 0=Female
Age How old are you? Open ended
Education of education you have achieved?
Now can you tell me the highest level
3=Middle School; 4=High School; 5=University+
1= No schooling; 2= Primary School;
SES your home: (read options)
tell me if you have the following items in
people often have in their homes. Please
I’m going to read you a list of things that
television, radio, cell phone, iPad
washing machine, sound system, cable,
Items: refrigerator, computer,
Traditional Partisan OTHER: Which party?)
identify with some other party? (IF
PAN-ista, PRI-ista, PRD-ista, or do you
do you normally consider yourself a
Regardless of which party you vote for,
Partido Encuentro Social, Partido Humanista
Convergencia, MORENA, Partido Nueva Alianza,
Partido Verde Ecologista, Partido del Trabajo,
Party options: PAN, PRI, PRD,
Political Interest How interested are you in politics? 1=Not at all; 2=A little; 3=Quite; 4=Very
EPN Approval Nieto?
performance of President Enrique Pen˜a
In general, how would you rate the
1=Very poor; 2=Poor; 3=Good; 4=Very good
Debater you?
people who do not necessarily agree with
Do you like to debate political issues with
1=Yes; 0=No
Number of Protests of the year? (Read all options)
you personally seen since the beginning
Approximately, how many protests have
3=6-10 protests; 4=+10 protests
1=0-1 proests; 2=2-5 protests;
Protester in the last five years?
Have you participated in a protest
1=Yes; 0=No
Victim has been a victim of organized crime?
Do you personally know anyone who
1=Yes; 0=No
Table B.2: Gender
Part I Part II Total
Male 308 310 610
% 50.83 51.67 51.24
Female 298 290 588
% 49.17 48.33 48.76
Total 606 600 1,206
% 100 100 100
Pearson chi2(1)=0.0855 Pr = 0.770
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Table B.3: Age
Part I Part II Total
18-25 71 66 137
% 11.72 11 11.36
26-40 109 122 231
% 17.99 20.33 19.15
41-60 244 253 497
% 40.26 42.17 41.21
61+ 181 159 340
% 29.87 26.5 28.19
Total 605 600 1,205
% 100 100 100
Pearson chi2(3)= 2.4799 Pr = 0.479
Table B.4: Education
Part I Part II Total
No Schooling 4 3 7
% 0.66 0.5 0.58
Primary 61 73 134
% 10.1 12.21 11.15
Middle School 102 19997 199
% 16.89 16.22 16.56
High School 140 154 294
% 23.18 25.75 24.46
University 297 271 568
% 49.17 45.32 47.25
Total 604 598 1,202
% 100 100 100
Pearson chi2(4)= 3.1700 Pr = 0.530
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Table B.5: SES
Part I Part II Total
0-1 Items 32 15 47
% 5.28 2.5 3.9
2-4 Items 88 89 177
% 14.52 14.83 14.68
5-7 Items 184 207 391
% 30.36 34.5 32.42
8-10 Items 302 289 591
% 49.83 48.17 49
Total 606 600 1,206
% 100 100 100
Pearson chi2(3)= 7.7638 Pr = 0.051
Table B.6: Party Identification
Part I Part I Total
PAN 49 61 110
% 8.09 10.17 9.12
PRI 62 56 118
% 10.23 9.33 9.78
PRD 44 38 82
% 7.26 6.33 6.8
Other 88 46 134
% 14.52 7.67 11.11
No Party 343 376 719
% 56.6 62.67 59.62
NR 20 23 43
% 3.3 3.83 3.57
Total 606 600 1,206
% 100 100 100
Pearson chi2(5)= 16.9119 Pr = 0.005
According to the chi-squared test, there was a significant difference in party support
between the two samples. The descriptive statistics in Table B.6 suggest that most of
this discrepancy can be explained by “other” supporters and non-partisans. It is possible
that Mexicans who reject the three main parties are somewhat indifferent between the
two responses. They may be somewhat sympathetic with a minor party one week and
then be frustrated with the whole political system the next week. Because most of
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the difference occurs in these two categories, it seems unlikely that the chi-squared test
indicates an ideological or deeply rooted difference between the samples.
Table B.7: Traditional Partisanship
Part I Part II Total
No/Other Party 451 445 896
% 74.42 74.17 74.3
Traditional Partisan 155 155 310
% 25.58 25.83 25.7
Total 606 600 1,206
% 100 100 100
Pearson chi2(1)=0.0103 Pr = 0.919
Table B.8: Political Variables
Variable Range N Mean Std. Dev. χ2
Interest 1-4 1201 2.48 1.08 0.839
EPN Approval 1-4 1146 1.88 0.88 0.463
Protest Exposure 1-4 1180 2.31 1.23 0.149
Have Protested 0-1 1204 0.19 0.40 0.913
Debate 0-1 1206 0.41 0.49 0.974
Victim 0-1 1202 0.45 0.50 0.928
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C. Vignettes (English Versions)
C.1. Treatment Vignettes
“Recently in Mexico City, [thousands of / a small group of] students and people from
different civil society organizations marched with [torches / small candles] from the Paseo
de la Reforma to the Zo´calo to demand that the federal government put an end to the
violence and corruption related to drug trafficking. In memory of the normalistas in
Ayotzinapa, protesters stated that they would continue to march until there was peace
and justice in Mexico. Some claimed that the government of Mexico was responsible
for the crimes that took place; others marched simply because they were tired of the
violence in Mexico. [The protest, a multitude of candles lit in the hope of ending violence,
interrupted traffic routes. The march caused traffic jams for several hours in the city
center and ultimately ended peacefully. / The march interrupted traffic routes, causing
traffic jams for several hours in the city center. The protest ended in clashes with
the police, who used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters. According
to initial reports, several participants were arrested and others were brought to local
hospitals.]”
C.2. Control Vignette
“A recently published survey shows that a majority of citizens are tired with the level of
violence in the country, but there is some disagreement about who is responsible for the
violence and what should be done to establish peace. The survey follows the unfortunate
occurrences that took place in Iguala (Guerrero) and seeks to understand what Mexican
citizens think about the violence from organized crime and what should be done about
it.”
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D. Information about the field treatments
The small protest was organized by the Planto´n por Ayotzinapa, a group demanding jus-
tice for the Ayotzinapa victims. The group maintained a small campsite - including food,
tents, thematically relevant art, and information about the movement - with twenty-four
hour presence in front of the attorney general’s office on the Paseo de la Reforma in the
city center. They began camping in December 2014 in order to apply constant pressure
on the Mexican government for the events of September. They organize cultural events
and demonstrations on a regular basis, on some occasions organizing more than once a
day. Most events are very small, involving a few hundred participants, and depend on a
network of highly dedicated activists and their presence on social media.
The small protest took place on April 26th between 4-6 pm. It began at the A´ngel
de la Independencia on the Paseo de la Reforma, where earlier that day the planto´n
had erected a monument to the 43 victims, and culminated at the Zo´calo. It is highly
unlikely that survey respondents would have anticipated the march because details of
the event were not publicly dispersed in the media. Indeed, the march was a relatively
low priority event for the day. The morning began with a large cultural event with
43 speakers and an opportunity for artists to create sculptures of turtles to represent
the slow progress towards justice. The few flyers that were distributed among activist
organizations provided details of these earlier events, but not for the march that would
follow hours later. Approximately 300 people attended the late afternoon march, many
of them wearing the turtle sculptures on their backs as they marched down Reforma.
A photo of this event, posted on the twitter account for @plantonporayotzi, appears in
Figure D1. For this first event, a team from BGC Beltra´n waited in a Starbucks caf
located at the A´ngel de la Independencia between 4-6 pm. The caf has large windows
facing the A´ngel to maximize visualization of the protest.
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Figure D.1: Small Protest
The large protest took place on May 15th and was organized by the National Union
for Teachers (CNTE). In Mexico, May 15th is a National Day for Teachers, and in
2015 the unions decided to celebrate their day with a massive protest. As is the case
with most large protests, there were a diverse set of interests represented at the march.
There was a call for education reform, but a significant proportion of the attendants
demanded justice for the 43 normalista students. Since the events of September 26th,
the Ayotzinapa protests were heavily supported by teachers’ unions, who felt solidarity
for the victimized teachers and students.
The protest was massive. Estimates suggest that there were 5,000 participants, with
representatives from sections 7, 9, 14, 18, 22, and 23 of CNTE in addition to represen-
tatives from the families of the Ayotzinapa victims. The original route went from San
Cosme, passed through the city center, and then ended at the Zo´calo. The day of the
march, to accommodate the size of the protest, they changed the route to end at Bellas
Artes, where the team from BGC Beltra´n was waiting for respondents in a caf called
Cielito. Despite the fact that there were policemen throughout the route, directing traf-
fic and restraining the protesters, the march ended peacefully. A photo of the march
from @Coordinadora1DM appears in Figure D2:
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Figure D.2: Small Protest
Upon arrival at both protest events, survey enumerators were instructed to administer
a manipulation check. Before asking substantive questions, they asked each respondent,
“Did you see the protest going on outside?” The purpose of this item was to call attention
to the protest treatment even if respondents had not noticed it independently.
CNTE and the teachers continued to protest in the city center for several weeks
following the second protest. In order to conduct the control event without protest
interference, we had to wait until mid-June for the mobilizations to die out. On June
23rd, the BGC Beltra´n team waited between 3-7 in a Starbucks on Reforma (close to
the Parque Chapultepec and far from the Zo´calo, to minimize the possibility of protest
exposure).
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E. Compliance
The full phone sample included 1200 individuals in the five selected colonias. The
response rates follow in Table E1:
Table E.1: Phone Survey Responses
AAPOR Response Rates
Response Rate 6.4%
Cooperation Rate 35%
Refusal Rate 10.6%
Contact Rate 18.2%
Of course, most of those 1200 respondents were not compliers for the field experiment.
For both treatment and control events, the compliers are a subsample of the respondents
of the phone survey who expressed interest in attending the follow-up interview. Of the
entire phone sample, 40% of respondents (n=478 of 1,198) indicated an interest in the
face-to-face follow-up. The 60% (n=720) who refused to participate in the study gave a
number of reasons. Many were too busy, were occupied on the days offered, or simply saw
no reason to go. Many others admitted that the face-to-face follow-up seemed suspicious,
and they were worried about falling victim to some sort of trap.
Table E.2: Contacting Potential Compliers
Provided Cellphone Provided Email
N % N %
No 250 52.3 298 62.34
Yes 228 47.7 180 37.66
Total 478 100 478 100
Not all of the 478 respondents who were open to the idea of attending the follow-
up interview were equally likely to comply. Of these respondents, only 37% (n=180)
provided an email address, 48% (n=228) provided a cellphone number, and 23% (n=108)
provided both. This information was used to send reminders closer to the date and
give confirmatory details about the timing and location of the interview. The 37% of
respondents who did not provide this information - and the greater (unknown) number
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who provided misleading information - were not likely to remember to attend or to
know when and where to arrive. Ultimately, a total of 300 respondents - minus those
respondents who provided disingenuous contact information - were considered to be
potential compliers.
Table E.3: Compliance Rates
N attended % with contact % phone sample
Small Protest 16 5% 1%
Large Protest 54 18% 5%
Control 19 6% 2%
Total 89 30% 7%
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F. Vignette Experiment, Full Output
Table F.1:
Vignette,Experiment, Marginal Effects
DV:,1=likely, very likely to engage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Talk Read Petition Contact Protest Vote
Small/Peaceful 0.022 0.073+ 0.037 0.041 0.022 0.009
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045)
Big/Peaceful 0.018 0.062 0.063 0.006 0.069 -0.001
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045)
Small/Violent -0.074+ -0.020 0.075+ 0.004 -0.000 0.020
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.043) (0.046)
Big/Violent 0.088* 0.039 0.099* -0.006 -0.003 0.117*
(0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Male 0.036 0.035 0.071* 0.021 0.055* 0.071*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030)
Education 0.006 0.009 -0.018* -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
SES 0.005 0.010 0.019** -0.001 0.003 0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Traditional Partisan 0.014 0.042 -0.002 0.034 -0.069* 0.090**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
Political Interest 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.038* 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.057***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
EPN Approval -0.036* -0.040* -0.048** 0.015 -0.060*** 0.034+
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Debater 0.103** 0.093** -0.001 0.026 -0.012 0.060+
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033)
Number of Protests 0.028* 0.015 0.023+ 0.022* 0.050*** -0.038**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Protester 0.030 0.062 0.150*** 0.019 0.251*** 0.100*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040)
Victim -0.004 0.031 0.025 -0.015 0.038 0.037
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031)
Observations 1,113 1,105 1,109 1,107 1,108 1,074
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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G. Heterogeneous Effects
Will protests have uniform effects across the population? Or might protest exposure
increase political engagement among some people more than others? In this section, I
will examine the heterogeneous effects of the protest treatments, focusing particularly
on the vignette experiment. I focus on the vignette experiment for practical and theo-
retical reasons. In practical terms, it would be methodologically infeasible to estimate
heterogeneous effects for the field experiment, which is limited to 88 respondents and
requires statistical weighting to balance treatment and control groups.
In addition to this methodological caveat, there are more theoretical reasons to em-
phasize the vignette experiment. According to well-established research in political
communication, the media focus of the vignette experiment is a highly appropriate con-
text to examine heterogeneous audience effects. This literature has long found that the
effects of media messages depend on the characteristics of the viewer (Klapper 1960).
Klapper’s classic meta-analysis concludes that the media might appear to have a mini-
mally persuasive impact, in large part, because it operates more frequently as an agent
of reinforcement than as an agent of change (p. 15). Viewers who already agree the
message are more likely to be impacted by the media content, whereas viewers who do
not already agree are less impressionable (Holbert, Garrett and Gleason 2010). These
effects are perpetuated because individuals actively choose to follow media that conforms
to their opinions (Prior 2007; Arceneaux and Johnson 2013) and because they dismiss
opposing viewpoints when forced to encounter them (Taber and Lodge 2006). Given this
extant research, it is fitting to ask whether protests reported in the media face similar
constraints as other political information.
The key characteristic that conditions the effect of media messages is the viewer’s prior
support of the message (Klapper 1960). Individuals who support the protest are likely
to respond positively to the message, and individuals who do not support the protest
are either less likely to exhibit any effects, or they may even respond negatively. For
the protests selected in this dissertation, it is not reasonable to expect respondents to
explicitly state opposition the protest message; few respondents would condemn protests
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that demand peace from organized crime. However, many respondents may condemn
the implicit message of the protests, which suggested that Enrique Pen˜a Nieto and
the political establishment were responsible for the students’ disappearances. Thus, I
operationalize protest support through variables that capture support for President Pen˜a
Nieto and the traditional political parties. Additionally, though I expect few respondents
would oppose the message of the protest, some observers may be more receptive than
others. Specifically, I expect that respondents who have personally suffered from political
violence, or who know someone else who has suffered, may be more significantly impacted
by the protest than their counterparts.
First, I will discuss the conditional effects of presidential approval. For these models,
presidential approval was transformed as a dummy variable, where 0 represents those
who disapprove and strongly disapprove of Pen˜a Nieto’s work in office and 1 represents
those who approve and strongly approve. Figure G1 reports the heterogeneous effects
of this variable on the engagement indicators. I ran separate models for each dependent
variable and at each level of the moderating variable. To maintain consistency between
all of the heterogeneous effect models, these models do not control for other covariates
beyond the moderators and each of the four treatments.
Figure G1 provides some evidence for the reinforcing effects of the protests. As the
figure indicates, many of the models that showed significant, positive effects of protests
are only significant for those who disapprove of Pen˜a Nieto. That is, the individuals who
demonstrated positive treatment effects in the previous models are the individuals who
are most receptive to protests critical of the president. Relative to the control group, the
Pen˜a Nieto disapprovers who are treated with the small, peaceful protest and the big,
peaceful protest vignettes more likely to read about and join a protest about political
violence, but these effects do not carry over to respondents who approve of the president.
There are also some significant differences for the large, violent protest vignette. For this
treatment, the positive effects on Talk and Protest (at the 90% level) are only significant
among those who disapprove of Pen˜a Nieto. The large, violent protest treatment has a
stronger significant effect on Vote for those who disapprove of the president.
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Figure G.1:
At the same time, those who express approval of Pen˜a Nieto experience some negative
effects of the protest treatments. These individuals are less likely to contact politicians
in response to the large, peaceful protest and less likely (at the 90% level) to talk about
political violence in response to the small, violent protest vignette. Indeed, the only
effect that runs counter to the media reinforcement hypothesis is the effect of the small,
violent protest on Petition. At the 90% level, this positive effect is only significant among
Pen˜a Nieto supporters.
Figure G2 shows that the conditional effects of partisanship are less clear than those of
presidential approval. Because the protests generally cast blame upon all of the Mexican
political establishment, I expected that the positive effects of protests would be strongest
respondents who reject the traditional political parties (PRI, PAN, and PRD). This is
true for a number of models, but there are a number of cases in which the positive effects
of the protest treatments are stronger or are only significant among traditional partisans.
For example, the positive effect of the big, peaceful protest on Vote is only significant
for partisans, as is the effect of the small, peaceful protest vignette on Petition (at the
90% level). Similarly, the Big/Violent has significantly greater marginal effects among
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partisans on the willingness to petition and vote. It is possible that the heterogeneous
effects would be more consistent if they were conditioned on PRI support, rather than
support for any of the three traditional parties. However, the low proportion of PRI-
istas in the sample (around 10%) prevents me from estimating these effects with any
precision.
Figure G.2:
The conditional effects by crime victimization are even less clear. As I show in Fig-
ure G3, many effects are only significant for organized crime victims, but at the same
time, several effects are restricted to non-victims. For example, the effect on Petition is
only significant among non-victims. This effect is relatively consistent across the protest
treatments. The effects of both peaceful protest treatments and the small, violent treat-
ment are only statistically significant among non-victims, and the effect of the large,
violent protest is only significant at the 90% level among victims.
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Figure G.3:
In summary, there is some evidence for the heterogeneity of protest effects. Research
in political communication finds heterogeneous constraints on the media’s ability to
influence viewers. Scholars do not find that any individual can be persuaded by the
messages they encounter in the media. But rather, the persuasive influence of the media
is generally limited to those individuals who were already supportive of the message.
When I examined the conditional effects of the vignette experiment, I found some evi-
dence that protest reports face similar constraints as other persuasive messages in the
media. This is particularly true when support for the protest is operationalized as dis-
approval for the sitting president. Those who disapprove of President Pen˜a Nieto are
consistently more likely to increase in their willingness to engage as a response to the
protest treatments, and those who approve of the president sometimes react negatively
to the treatments. Meanwhile, other operationalizations of protest support - such as
rejection of the traditional parties or organized crime victimization - do not result in
such predictable outcomes. In spite of the theoretical expectations, many of the positive
effects of the protest treatments are targeted among partisans and non-victims.
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H. Overlap
Figure H1 shows the overlap plots of the treatment assignment model. The top figure
combines both treatment groups, and the bottom figures address each separately. Given
the covariates listed above, there are no large masses at either 0 or 1. That is, the
treatment model is not so restrictive that it perfectly predicts assignment to the control
group or either of the treatment groups. In fact, the treatment model shows very clear
overlap of density masses, particularly for the large protest treatment and the combined
treatments. As an additional check, I ran a test on each model to identify any observa-
tions that violate the overlap assumptions and found zero violations. These tests provide
sufficient evidence that the predicted inverse-probability weights should not be too large
to compute stable estimates.
Figure H.1:
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